Reuters
LONDON – Senior British officials said on
Tuesday that they did not receive warnings from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York about possible rate-rigging during the financial crisis of
2008.
Speaking to a British parliamentary committee
on Tuesday, Mervyn A. King, governor of the Bank of England, said
discussions with American authorities had instead focused on ways to
improve the London interbank offered rate, or Libor.
Timothy F. Geithner, who then ran the New
York Fed, sent an e-mail to Mr. King in June 2008 that outlined reforms
to the Libor system. They included recommendations that British
officials “strengthen governance and establish a credible reporting
procedure” and “eliminate incentive to misreport,” according to
documents released last week.
Mr. King said the correspondence with Mr.
Geithner, who is now the United States Treasury secretary, did not
represent a warning about potential illegal activity related to Libor.
“At no stage did he or anyone else at the New
York Fed raise any concerns with the Bank that they had seen any
wrongdoing,” Mr. King told the parliamentary committee on Tuesday.
“There was no suggestion of fraudulent behavior.”
Mr. King also provided additional detail about his discussions with Mr. Geithner concerning Libor.
The two men met in Basel, Switzerland, in May
2008 during a regular meeting of central bankers from the world’s
leading economies. During a conversation, Mr. King said he had asked Mr.
Geithner to submit suggestions about potential changes to the Libor
system, according to Mr. King’s testimony on Tuesday.
The discussion was followed by several phone
calls between Paul Tucker, deputy governor of the Bank of England, and
William C. Dudley, the current president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, who was the executive vice president of its markets group at
the time of the discussions.
Mr. King said the New York Fed did not share
internal memorandums, which questioned whether international banks were
accurately reporting their Libor submissions. American authorities began
collecting information as early as 2007 about potential problems with
the rate-setting process.
“Our contacts at Libor contributing banks
have indicated a tendency to underreport actual borrowing costs,” New
York Fed officials wrote in one of the memos, “to limit the potential
for speculation about the institutions’ liquidity problems.”
Mr. King said some of the recommendations
about changes to Libor that Mr. Geithner had sent in 2008 were included
in a report by the British Bankers’ Association, the trade body that
oversees the rate. The industry association released a review in late
2008 that outlined changes to the Libor process.
“At no stage did the New York Fed express any concerns about the final outcome,” Mr. King told the parliamentary committee.
Senior British officials said they did not
believe the New York Fed’s recommendations were a warning that Libor was
being manipulated, according to Mr. Tucker of the Bank of England, the
country’s central bank. Suggestions from American authorities included
how to “eliminate incentive to misreport” Libor submissions, as well as
expanding the number of international banks that participated in the
rate-setting process.
The recommendations “didn’t set off alarm bells,” Mr. Tucker said on Tuesday.
Mr. Tucker’s role in the rate-manipulation
scandal was again questioned after new e-mails were released on Tuesday
that detailed his discussions with Robert E. Diamond Jr., former chief
executive of Barclays.
Documents from Barclays and government
authorities show that the Bank of England official called Mr. Diamond in
October 2008 to discuss the firm’s funding position at the height of
the financial crisis. Regulators said Jerry del Missier, a top Barclays
executive, later misinterpreted that conversation as an instruction from
the British central bank to lower the firm’s Libor submissions.
The new e-mails released by the Bank of
England show that Mr. Tucker had written to Mr. Diamond about Libor as
earlier as May, 2008.
The documents also illustrate a close
relationship between Mr. Diamond and the government official. After it
was announced that Mr. Tucker would become deputy governor of the Bank
of England in December 2008, Mr. Diamond e-mailed to congratulate him:
“Well done, man. I am really, really proud of you,” Mr. Diamond wrote.
Mr. Tucker was equally friendly in his
response. “Thanks so much Bob. You’ve been an absolute brick through
this,” he said in an e-mail reply.
British lawmakers also questioned the senior
officials on Tuesday about the steps that led to Mr. Diamond’s
resignation this month. The British bank agreed to a $450 million
settlement in June in connection with the manipulation of Libor.
Two days after the settlement was announced,
Adair Turner, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority, talked
to Barclays’ chairman, Marcus Agius, about whether Mr. Diamond was the
right person to lead the bank.
The Financial Services Authority had
previously raised concerns about the bank’s corporate culture, and Mr.
Turner said there were questions about whether Mr. Diamond was the most
appropriate individual to lead the changes in governance inside
Barclays.
The conversation was followed by a discussion
between Mr. King and Mr. Agius on July 2, during which Mr. King said
Mr. Diamond no longer had the support of the Financial Services
Authority.
After the discussion, Mr. Agius held a
conference call with the bank’s nonexecutive directors, who decided to
ask Mr. Diamond to resign.
“If Bob Diamond had stayed on,” Mr. Turner
told the parliamentary committee on Tuesday, “I strongly suspect that it
would have been to the disadvantage of shareholders as well.”
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/bank-of-england-chief-denies-n-y-fed-gave-warning-on-rate-rigging/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
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